

ASPEN CASEBOOK SERIES

# Cases and Materials on Corporations

EIGHTH EDITION

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# CONTENTS

*Preface*

*xxv*

## I. INTRODUCTION 1

|  |    |
|--|----|
| A. The Legal Character of the Corporation:           |    |
| Factors Influencing Choice of the Corporate Form     | 1  |
| B. An Overview of This Casebook                      | 3  |
| C. A Scorecard of the Players: Public Corporations,  |    |
| Managers, Directors, and Shareholders                | 4  |
| 1. A Corporate Census                                | 4  |
| 2. The Individual Participants                       | 5  |
| D. History and Evolution of the Business Corporation | 18 |
| 1. The Early American Experience                     | 19 |
| Lawrence Friedman, A History of                      |    |
| American Law   | 19 |
| 2. Nineteenth-Century Efforts to Control             |    |
| the Corporation                                      | 22 |
| Lawrence Friedman, A History of                      |    |
| American Law   | 23 |
| 3. Twentieth-Century Developments                    | 25 |
| a. The "Race to the Bottom" Thesis                   | 26 |
| b. The Rise of Managerial Capitalism                 | 27 |
| E. Economic Analysis of the Corporation              | 29 |
| 1. The Nature of the Firm and the Rise of the        |    |
| M-Form Corporation                                   | 29 |
| 2. Managerial Discretion: The Debate over the        |    |
| Berle-Means Thesis                                   | 31 |
| 3. The Agency Cost Model                             | 32 |
| F. The Social Responsibility of the Corporation      | 35 |
| 1. To Whom Do Fiduciary Duties Run?                  | 35 |
| E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are                        |    |
| Corporate Managers Trustees?                         | 36 |

|    |   |    |
|----|---|----|
|    | Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits   | 37 |
|    | <i>American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance—Objective and Conduct of the Corporation</i>                  | 38 |
| 2. | The Rise of Corporate Constituency Statutes   | 41 |
|    | <i>New York Business Corporation Law—Duty of Directors</i>  | 42 |
|    | <i>Connecticut Business Corporation Law—Board of Directors</i>  | 42 |
| 3. | Objections to Constituency Statutes   | 43 |
|    | <i>American Bar Association Committee on Corporate Laws, Report: Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for Confusion</i> | 44 |
| 4. | The Case for Constituency Statutes  | 46 |
| G. | The Global Perspective  | 47 |

## II. BASIC NORMS AND DUTIES FOR MANAGEMENT OF CORPORATIONS 53

|    |  |    |
|----|--|----|
| A. | Transaction of Corporate Business  | 53 |
| 1. | Introduction   | 53 |
|    | <i>Model Business Corporation Act—Requirement For and Duties of Board of Directors</i> | 54 |
| 2. | Directors  | 55 |
| a. | Formalities Required   | 55 |
|    | <i>Model Business Corporation Act—Meetings</i>   | 55 |
| b. | Effect of Failure to Follow Requirements   | 56 |
| 3. | Officers   | 56 |
| a. | Authority  | 56 |
|    | <i>Menard, Inc. v. Dage-MTI, Inc.</i>  | 56 |
| b. | Ultra Vires Doctrine   | 64 |
|    | <i>Real Estate Capital Corp. v. Thunder Corp.</i>                                      | 66 |
|    | <i>Ohio General Corporation Law—Authority of Corporation</i>                           | 68 |
|    | <i>Model Business Corporation Act—Ultra Vires</i>                                      | 68 |
| B. | Managers' Responsibilities and Compensation  | 69 |
| 1. | Introduction   | 69 |
| 2. | Disinterested Conduct: Duty of Care  | 69 |
|    | <i>Shlensky v. Wrigley</i>   | 71 |
|    | <i>Miller v. American Telephone &amp; Telegraph Co.</i>                                | 73 |
|    | <i>In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation</i>                                     | 83 |

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| <i>Stone v. Ritter</i>  | 94  |
| <i>American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance — Duty of Care of Directors and Officers; Business Judgment Rule</i>      | 99  |
| 3. Transactions in Which Directors, Officers, and Shareholders Have a Personal Interest:  |     |
| Duty of Loyalty   | 107 |
| a. Contracts with Interested Directors  | 107 |
| <i>Cookies Food Products, Inc. v. Lakes Warehouse Distributing, Inc.</i>  | 108 |
| <i>New York Business Corporation Law — Interested Directors</i>   | 115 |
| <i>California General Corporation Law — Contracts in Which Director Has Material Financial Interest; Validity</i>                       | 116 |
| <i>American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance — Transactions with the Corporation</i>                                   | 117 |
| b. Special Problems of Parent-Subsidiary  | 125 |
| <i>Case v. New York Central R.R.</i>  | 125 |
| <i>Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien</i>   | 127 |
| c. Compensation of Managers   | 131 |
| i. Salaries, Bonuses, Pensions  | 132 |
| <i>Mlinarcik v. E.E. Wehrung Parking, Inc.</i>  | 133 |
| ii. Stock Options   | 143 |
| <i>New Mexico Business Corporation Act — Stock Rights and Options</i>   | 144 |
| <i>Seidman v. Clifton Savings Bank, S.L.A.</i>  | 145 |
| d. Corporate Opportunities and Competition with the Corporation   | 154 |
| <i>Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch</i>  | 154 |
| <i>Rapistan Corp. v. Michaels</i>   | 159 |
| <i>Burg v. Horn</i>   | 163 |
| <i>American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance — Taking of Corporate Opportunities by Directors or Senior Executives</i> | 166 |
| <i>Model Business Corporation Act — Business Opportunities</i>  | 167 |

### **III. AN INTRODUCTION TO CORPORATE FINANCE** **169**

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| A. Valuation: How Are Financial Assets Valued?                                       | 171 |
| 1. Valuation Under Certainty: Present Value and the Time Value of Money              | 171 |
| <i>William A. Klein &amp; John C. Coffee, Jr., Business Organization and Finance</i> | 171 |

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| 2. Valuation Under Uncertainty: Risk and Diversification   | 175 |
| a. Expected Value  | 176 |
| b. Risk  | 176 |
| c. Diversification   | 179 |
| d. The Capital Asset Pricing Model   | 181 |
| 3. The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis   | 184 |
| <i>Kamin v. American Express Company</i>   | 192 |
| B. Capital Structure: Does the Ownership Structure of a Corporation Affect Its Value?                                  | 194 |
| 1. A Survey of Financial Assets  | 194 |
| a. Common Stock  | 194 |
| b. Debt  | 195 |
| c. Preferred Stock   | 196 |
| d. Warrants  | 197 |
| e. Hybrid Financial Assets   | 197 |
| 2. Why Capital Structure Should Not Affect the Value of the Corporation: The Miller-Modigliani Irrelevance Proposition | 199 |
| 3. Why Capital Structure May Affect Firm Value   | 201 |
| a. Taxes   | 201 |
| b. The Information Content of Capital Structure  | 202 |
| c. The Disciplinary Effect of Debt   | 203 |
| d. Bankruptcy Costs  | 204 |
| C. Opportunism Among the Holders of Financial Claims: Option Pricing   | 206 |
| 1. The Basic Structure of Put and Call Options   | 207 |
| 2. The Determinants of Option Value  | 208 |
| a. Current Value of the Underlying Asset   | 208 |
| b. The Exercise Price  | 208 |
| c. The Time Value of Money   | 209 |
| d. Variability in the Value of the Underlying Asset  | 209 |
| e. Time Remaining Until Expiration   | 210 |
| 3. Modes of Opportunistic Behavior Among Holders of Financial Assets   | 210 |
| a. Increasing the Riskiness of the Corporation's Investments   | 211 |
| b. Increasing the Firm's Leverage by Withdrawing Funds   | 212 |
| c. Increasing the Value of the Option by Extending Its Term  | 213 |
| D. Protection Against Intracorporate Opportunism   | 214 |
| 1. Weak Protection: The Statutory Legal Capital Structure  | 215 |
| 2. Fraudulent Conveyance Law   | 218 |
| 3. Contractual Protection: Bond Covenants  | 220 |
| a. Investment Activity Covenants   | 220 |
| b. Capital Structure Covenants   | 220 |
| c. Dividend and Stock Repurchase Covenants   | 221 |

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| 4. Fiduciary Duty and the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing         | 223 |
| <i>Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp.</i> | 224 |

## **IV. FORMING THE CORPORATION** **229**

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| A. Selection of State of Incorporation   | 229 |
| B. Compliance with State Requirements  | 234 |
| 1. Preparation of Documents  | 234 |
| <i>Delaware General Corporation Law — How Corporation Formed</i>                             | 234 |
| 2. Meeting Statutory Formalities   | 236 |
| 3. "Domestication" of Foreign Corporations   | 237 |
| C. Defective Incorporation   | 238 |
| <i>Thompson &amp; Green Machinery Co. v. Music City Lumber Co.</i>                           | 239 |
| <i>Delaware General Corporation Law — Defective Organization of Corporation as a Defense</i> | 243 |
| <i>Model Business Corporation Act — Liability for Preincorporation Transactions</i>          | 243 |
| <i>Sulphur Export Corp. v. Carribean Clipper Lines, Inc.</i>                                 | 244 |
| <i>Ohio General Corporation Law — Liability for Nonpayment of Initial Stated Capital</i>     | 245 |
| D. Disregarding the Corporate Entity   | 246 |
| <i>Perpetual Real Estate Services, Inc. v. Michaelson Properties, Inc.</i>                   | 249 |
| <i>Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan</i>  | 252 |
| <i>Texas For-Profit Corporations Code — Limitation of Liability for Obligations</i>          | 257 |
| <i>Walkovsky v. Carlton</i>  | 257 |
| <i>Fletcher v. Atex, Inc.</i>  | 263 |
| <i>Bartle v. Home Owners Cooperative</i>   | 271 |
| <i>Stone v. Eacho</i>  | 273 |
| E. Pre-Formation Transactions  | 277 |
| 1. Liability of the Corporation for Debts of Its Predecessor                                 | 277 |
| <i>Tift v. Forage King Industries, Inc.</i>  | 277 |
| <i>J. F. Anderson Lumber Co. v. Myers</i>  | 279 |
| <i>Model Business Corporation Act — Known Claims Against Dissolved Corporation</i>           | 281 |
| 2. Promoters' Contracts  | 282 |
| a. Introduction  | 282 |

|    |  |     |
|----|--|-----|
| b. | Liability of the Corporation               | 284 |
|    | <i>Kridelbaugh v. Aldrehn Theatres Co.</i> | 284 |
| c. | Liability of the Promoters                 | 286 |
|    | <i>Sherwood &amp; Roberts—Oregon,</i>      |     |
|    | <i>Inc. v. Alexander</i>                   | 286 |
|    | <i>How &amp; Associates, Inc. v. Boss</i>  | 288 |

## V. CORPORATE DISCLOSURE AND SECURITIES FRAUD 291

|    |   |     |
|----|---|-----|
| A. | Introduction  | 291 |
| B. | The Disclosure System                                       | 292 |
|    | 1. The Securities Act of 1933                               | 293 |
|    | 2. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934                      | 294 |
|    | 3. "Blue Sky" Regulation                                    | 296 |
|    | 4. Disclosure Requirements of Self-Regulatory Organizations | 298 |
|    | 5. When Does the Disclosure Obligation Arise?               | 300 |
|    | <i>Financial Industrial Fund, Inc. v.</i>                   |     |
|    | <i>McDonnell Douglas Corp.</i>                              | 300 |
|    | <i>Basic, Inc. v. Levinson</i>                              | 304 |
|    | <i>Backman v. Polaroid Corp.</i>                            | 309 |
| C. | Civil Liability   | 313 |
|    | 1. Common Law Remedies                                      | 314 |
|    | 2. Blue Sky Statutes  | 315 |
|    | 3. The Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure                         | 315 |
|    | <i>Malone v. Brincat</i>                                    | 315 |
|    | 4. Federal Law: Express Actions                             | 321 |
|    | 5. Federal Law: Implied Civil Liabilities                   | 323 |
|    | a. The Origin of Rule 10b-5                                 | 323 |
|    | <i>Securities Exchange Act of 1934,</i>                     |     |
|    | <i>Section 10</i>   | 323 |
|    | b. The Rationale and Scope of Implied Liabilities           | 324 |
|    | <i>J. I. Case Co. v. Borak</i>                              | 325 |
|    | c. The Elements of a Cause of Action Under Rule 10b-5       | 332 |
|    | i. Standing Under Rule 10b-5: Limiting the Plaintiff Class  | 332 |
|    | <i>Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores</i>                | 332 |
|    | ii. Materiality   | 346 |
|    | <i>Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano</i>              | 346 |
|    | <i>Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg</i>                | 359 |
|    | iii. Causation  | 365 |
|    | <i>Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States</i>             | 365 |
|    | <i>Basic, Inc. v. Levinson</i>                              | 367 |
|    | <i>Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo</i>                 | 374 |

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| iv. Scienter  | 379 |
| <i>Ernst &amp; Ernst v. Hochfelder</i>  | 379 |
| <i>Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &amp; Rights, Ltd.</i>   | 388 |
| v. Damages  | 396 |
| <i>Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.</i>   | 396 |
| vi. Statute of Limitations Applicable to Rule 10b-5   | 405 |
| vii. Contribution   | 406 |
| d. The Policy Dilemma Surrounding Securities Class Actions  | 407 |
| The Empirical Evidence: A Complex Thicket   | 408 |
| e. The Response of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995                             | 410 |
| f. The Impact of the 1995 Act   | 412 |
| g. Transactions Not Covered by the Rule   | 413 |
| i. Corporate Mismanagement  | 413 |
| <i>Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life &amp; Casualty Co.</i>                               | 413 |
| <i>Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green</i>   | 415 |
| <i>Goldberg v. Meridor</i>  | 420 |
| ii. Aiding and Abetting   | 424 |
| <i>Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver</i>                                    | 424 |
| <i>Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders</i>  | 430 |
| D. Insider Trading  | 436 |
| 1. Rule 10b-5 and Insider Trading   | 436 |
| a. The Rationale and Scope of the Prohibition   | 436 |
| <i>In the Matter of Cady, Roberts &amp; Co.</i>   | 436 |
| b. The Harms from Insider Trading   | 438 |
| i. Corporate Harm   | 439 |
| ii. Allocational Efficiency and the Injury of Delayed Disclosure                                    | 440 |
| iii. Investor Injury  | 440 |
| c. The “Benefits” of Insider Trading  | 442 |
| d. The Enforceability of the Prohibition  | 443 |
| <i>Dirks v. SEC</i>   | 444 |
| e. Selective Disclosure and Regulation FD   | 456 |
| <i>Regulation FD, Section 100</i>   | 458 |
| f. Misappropriation Theory  | 460 |
| <i>United States v. O’Hagan</i>   | 460 |
| g. Insider Trading and the Remote Tippee  | 479 |
| <i>United States v. Chestman</i>  | 479 |
| h. Causation and Damages in Insider Trading Cases   | 488 |
| <i>Elkind v. Liggett &amp; Myers, Inc.</i>  | 490 |
| 2. Section 16(b) and “Short Swing” Profits  | 496 |
| <i>Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Directors, Officers, and Principal Stockholders, Section 16</i> | 496 |

|    |  |     |
|----|--|-----|
| a. | Who Is Covered?  | 497 |
|    | <i>Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &amp; Smith, Inc. v. Livingston</i> | 497 |
|    | <i>CBI Industries, Inc. v. Horton</i>                                | 499 |
|    | <i>Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co.</i>                 | 502 |
| b. | The Definition of "Purchase or Sale"                                 | 510 |
|    | <i>Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.</i>            | 510 |
| 3. | Common Law Liability to the Corporation                              | 518 |
|    | <i>Diamond v. Oreamuno</i>   | 518 |
|    | <i>Freeman v. Decio</i>  | 523 |

## VI. VOTING AND CORPORATE CONTROL 531

|    |   |     |
|----|---|-----|
| A. | Overview: Voting and "Shareholder Democracy"  | 531 |
| B. | The Substantive Law of Shareholder Voting   | 539 |
| 1. | Who Votes?  | 539 |
|    | <i>Delaware General Corporation Law — Classes and Series of Stock</i>                               | 539 |
|    | <i>Delaware General Corporation Law — Voting, Inspection, and Other Rights of Debenture Holders</i> | 539 |
|    | Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, <i>Voting in Corporate Law</i>                                  | 540 |
| 2. | What Vote Is Required?  | 541 |
| 3. | When Should a Shareholder Vote Be Required?   | 543 |
| a. | A Shareholder Power of Initiative?  | 545 |
| b. | Timing  | 545 |
|    | <i>Hilton Hotels Corp. v. ITT Corp.</i>   | 545 |
| c. | Evasions of the Voting Requirement  | 548 |
|    | <i>Hilton Hotels Corporation v. ITT Corp.</i>   | 548 |
| 4. | What Voting Power Should a Share Carry?   |     |
|    | Rule 19c-4 and the "One Share, One Vote" Controversy  | 556 |
| a. | The New York Stock Exchange's Policy  | 556 |
|    | Voting Rights Listing   |     |
|    | Standards — Proposed  |     |
|    | Disenfranchisement Rule   | 558 |
| b. | SEC Response and Judicial Reaction  | 560 |
| c. | Coercion and State Law Limitations  | 561 |
|    | <i>Lacos Land Co. v. Arden Group, Inc.</i>  | 561 |
| 5. | Vote Buying   | 566 |
|    | <i>New York Business Corporation Law — Proxies</i>  | 566 |
|    | <i>Schreiber v. Carney</i>  | 567 |
| C. | Voting Procedures   | 573 |
| 1. | Record Dates  | 574 |
| 2. | Proxies   | 574 |

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| 3. "Street Name" Ownership  | 576 |
| 4. Inspector of Elections   | 578 |
| 5. Stockholder Consents   | 579 |
| <i>Delaware General Corporation</i>                                       |     |
| <i>Law—Consent in Lieu of Meeting</i>                                     | 579 |
| <i>Datapoint Corp. v. Plaza Securities Co.</i>                            | 580 |
| D. Proxy Contest Expenses   | 584 |
| <i>Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine &amp;</i>                                |     |
| <i>Airplane Corp.</i>   | 584 |
| E. Special Voting Systems: Cumulative, Class,<br>and Supermajority Voting | 587 |
| 1. Cumulative Voting  | 587 |
| a. Evasions   | 589 |
| b. Cumulative Voting and the Removal of<br>Directors                      | 589 |
| c. Pros and Cons of Cumulative Voting                                     | 590 |
| d. Cumulative Voting in Practice  | 590 |
| 2. Class Voting   | 591 |
| <i>New York Business Corporation</i>                                      |     |
| <i>Law—Class Voting on Amendment</i>                                      | 592 |
| a. Is Coercion Still Possible?  | 592 |
| b. Ambiguities  | 593 |
| c. Mergers  | 593 |
| 3. Supermajority Voting   | 594 |
| <i>Revised Model Business Corporation</i>                                 |     |
| <i>Act—Greater Quorum or Voting</i>                                       |     |
| <i>Requirements</i>   | 594 |
| F. Removal and Vacancies  | 594 |
| 1. Directors  | 594 |
| <i>Delaware General Corporation</i>                                       |     |
| <i>Law—Board of Directors</i>   | 595 |
| 2. Filling Board Vacancies  | 597 |
| <i>New York Business Corporation</i>                                      |     |
| <i>Law—Newly Created Directorships</i>                                    |     |
| <i>and Vacancies</i>  | 597 |
| 3. Removal of Officers  | 598 |
| <i>New York Business Corporation</i>                                      |     |
| <i>Law—Removal of Officers</i>  | 598 |
| G. Judicial Supervision of Election Contests                              | 599 |
| <i>Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.</i>                            | 599 |
| <i>Stroud v. Grace</i>  | 601 |
| <i>MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc.</i>                           | 608 |
| <i>Mercier v. Inter-Tel, Inc.</i>   | 620 |
| H. Shareholders' Right of Inspection                                      | 621 |
| <i>Delaware General Corporation</i>                                       |     |
| <i>Law—Inspection of Books and Records</i>                                | 622 |
| <i>Seinfeld v. Verizon Communications,</i>                                |     |
| <i>Inc.</i>   | 623 |
| I. Federal Law  | 634 |
| <i>Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Proxies,</i>                          |     |
| <i>Section 14</i>   | 634 |

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| 1. Solicitations to Which Rules Apply            | 636 |
| <i>Securities Exchange Act Release</i>           |     |
| No. 34-31326                                     | 636 |
| 2. Reform of the Nomination and Election Process | 646 |
| a. Access to the Proxy Statement                 | 647 |
| b. "Say-on-Pay" Votes                            | 648 |
| c. Curbing Broker Votes                          | 649 |
| 3. Information Required to Be Furnished          | 649 |
| a. Executive Compensation                        | 650 |
| b. Annual Report                                 | 651 |
| c. Soliciting Materials and Preliminary Review   | 652 |
| 4. Requirements as to Proxy                      | 652 |
| <i>Rule 14a-4—Requirements as to Proxy</i>       | 652 |
| 5. Mailing Communications for Security Holders   | 656 |
| 6. Shareholder Proposals                         | 658 |
| <i>Medical Committee for Human</i>               |     |
| <i>Rights v. SEC</i>                             | 658 |
| <i>American Federation of State,</i>             |     |
| <i>County &amp; Municipal Employees,</i>         |     |
| <i>Employees Pension Plan v. American</i>        |     |
| <i>International Group, Inc.</i>                 | 672 |
| <i>CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees</i>              |     |
| <i>Pension Plan</i>                              | 679 |
| 7. Antifraud Liability                           | 687 |
| <i>Rule 14a-9—False or Misleading</i>            |     |
| <i>Statements</i>                                | 687 |
| 8. Causation                                     | 692 |
| <i>Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.</i>           | 692 |
| <i>Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg</i>     | 695 |

## **VII. BUSINESS ORGANIZATION FOR THE SMALLER ENTERPRISE: PARTNERSHIPS, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, AND OTHER NON-CORPORATE FORMS 701**

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| A. Introduction                                    | 701 |
| B. Partnerships                                    | 704 |
| 1. The Nature of Partnership: Aggregate or Entity? | 705 |
| <i>Fairway Development v. Title Ins.</i>           |     |
| <i>Co. of Minnesota</i>                            | 705 |
| 2. Formation                                       | 707 |
| <i>Vohland v. Sweet</i>                            | 707 |
| 3. Powers of Partners                              | 711 |
| 4. Liabilities of Partners                         | 713 |
| 5. Partnership Governance                          | 713 |
| 6. Fiduciary Duties                                | 714 |
| <i>Meinhard v. Salmon</i>                          | 714 |

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| 7. Partnership Dissolution  | 721 |
| C. Close Corporations   | 722 |
| 1. Restrictions on Transfer of Shares   | 726 |
| <i>Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp.</i>   | 727 |
| <i>Delaware General Corporation</i>   |     |
| <i>Law — Restriction on Transfer of Securities</i>  | 731 |
| 2. Special Agreements Allocating Authority  | 734 |
| a. Shareholder Agreements Respecting Election of Directors  | 735 |
| <i>Revised Model Business Corporation Act — Greater Quorum or Voting Requirements</i>   | 737 |
| <i>Ringling v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum &amp; Bailey Combined Shows, Inc.</i>  | 737 |
| b. Voting Trusts  | 742 |
| <i>Abercrombie v. Davies</i>  | 743 |
| <i>Delaware General Corporation</i>   |     |
| <i>Law — Voting Trusts</i>  | 747 |
| c. Agreements Respecting Actions of Directors   | 748 |
| <i>McQuade v. Stoneham</i>  | 749 |
| <i>New York Business Corporation</i>  |     |
| <i>Law — Greater Requirement as to Quorum and Vote of Directors</i>   | 752 |
| <i>Clark v. Dodge</i>   | 753 |
| <i>New York Business Corporation</i>  |     |
| <i>Law — Control of Directors</i>   | 756 |
| <i>Maryland General Corporation</i>   |     |
| <i>Law — Unanimous Stockholders' Agreement</i>  | 757 |
| d. Directors' Delegation of Management Authority  | 758 |
| <i>Pioneer Specialties, Inc. v. Nelson</i>  | 759 |
| 3. Resolution of Disputes and Deadlocks   | 761 |
| a. Arbitration  | 763 |
| b. Protecting the Minority in the Absence of a Shareholder Agreement: Judicial Imposition of a Fiduciary Duty on the Majority | 764 |
| <i>Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.</i>  | 764 |
| <i>McLaughlin v. Schenck</i>  | 772 |
| c. Receivers, Provisional Directors, or Custodians  | 775 |
| <i>Delaware General Corporation</i>   |     |
| <i>Law — Appointment of Custodian or Receiver</i>   | 775 |
| <i>Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp.</i>  | 777 |
| d. Dissolution and Oppression   | 780 |
| <i>Nelkin v. H.J.R. Realty Corp.</i>  | 781 |
| <i>Meiselman v. Meiselman</i>   | 784 |

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| D. Limited Partnerships   | 796 |
| 1. Formation  | 798 |
| 2. Control and Liability  | 798 |
| 3. Fiduciary Duty   | 800 |
| a. Contractual Amendment of the General Partner's Fiduciary Duty  | 800 |
| b. Who Owes the Fiduciary Duty?   | 804 |
| E. Limited Liability Companies  | 804 |
| 1. Tax Advantages   | 805 |
| 2. Organization, Structure, and Terminology   | 806 |
| <i>Westec v. Lanham and Preferred Income Investors, LLC</i>   | 807 |
| 3. What Is a Limited Liability Company?   | 813 |
| a. Piercing the Veil of an LLC  | 813 |
| <i>Bastan v. RJM &amp; Associates, LLC</i>  | 813 |
| b. The Scope of Fiduciary Duties  | 816 |
| c. Fiduciary Duty and the Problem of the Default Rule   | 816 |
| <i>Auriga Capital Corporation v. Gatz Properties, LLC</i>   | 817 |
| <i>Myron T. Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies</i> | 820 |
| d. Miscellaneous Categorization Problems  | 822 |
| F. Limited Liability Partnerships   | 822 |
| G. Entity Rationalization and the Proliferation of Organizational Forms   | 823 |

## VIII. SHAREHOLDERS' SUITS 827

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| A. Introduction  | 827 |
| <i>Federal Rules of Civil Procedure</i>  |     |
| 23.1—Derivative Actions by Shareholders  | 830 |
| B. Exhaustion of Internal Remedies   | 831 |
| 1. Demand on Directors   | 831 |
| <i>Marx v. Akers</i>   | 831 |
| 2. The Board's Authority to Terminate the Suit   | 840 |
| <i>Levine v. Smith</i>   | 841 |
| <i>Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado</i>   | 847 |
| <i>Alford v. Shaw</i>  | 855 |
| <i>Model Business Corporation Act—Dismissal</i>  | 860 |
| <i>American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance—Dismissal of a Derivative Action</i> | 861 |
| 3. Demand on Shareholders  | 864 |
| <i>Mayer v. Adams</i>  | 864 |

|    |  |     |
|----|--|-----|
| C. | Qualifications of Plaintiff Shareholder  | 872 |
|    | <i>California General Corporation Law</i>  | 873 |
|    | <i>American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance—Standing to Maintain a Derivative Action</i> | 875 |
|    | <i>Courtland Manor, Inc. v. Leeds</i>  | 876 |
|    | <i>Goldie v. Yaker</i>   | 880 |
| D. | Security for Expenses  | 883 |
|    | <i>Donner Management Co. v. Schaffer</i>   | 883 |
|    | <i>New Jersey Business Corporation Act—Actions by Shareholders</i>   | 886 |
| E. | Defending Against Derivative Suits   | 889 |
| 1. | Conflicting Interests of Defendants  | 889 |
|    | <i>Patrick v. Alacer Corp.</i>   | 889 |
| 2. | Conflicting Interests of Defendants' Counsel   | 892 |
|    | <i>Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp.</i>  | 892 |
| F. | Dismissal, Discontinuance, and Settlement  | 897 |
|    | <i>New York Business Corporation Law—Shareholders' Derivative Action</i>                                   | 897 |
| G. | Characterization of the Suit   | 899 |
| 1. | Derivative or Direct   | 899 |
|    | <i>Grimes v. Donald</i>  | 900 |
| 2. | Special Circumstances in Derivative Suits  | 905 |
|    | <i>Barth v. Barth</i>  | 905 |
| H. | Reimbursement of Plaintiff's Expenses  | 910 |
|    | <i>In re Wachovia Shareholders Litigation</i>  | 910 |
| I. | Indemnification of Defendants  | 920 |
|    | <i>Waltuch v. Conticommodity Services, Inc.</i>  | 921 |
|    | <i>Baker v. Health Management Systems, Inc.</i>  | 927 |
|    | <i>Ridder v. CityFed Financial Corp.</i>   | 931 |

## **IX. CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, TAKEOVERS, AND CONTROL TRANSACTIONS 935**

|    |   |     |
|----|---|-----|
| A. | Introduction  | 935 |
| 1. | Transactional Techniques: Allocation of Decision Authority for Control Transactions | 937 |
| 2. | Types of Control Transactions and Their Regulation                                  | 940 |
| 3. | Public Policy and Corporate Control Transactions: The Stakeholder Debate            | 942 |
| B. | Hostile Transactions  | 943 |
| 1. | The Early Doctrine  | 943 |
|    | <i>Cheff v. Mathes</i>  | 943 |
| 2. | The Demand for and Supply of Defensive Tactics                                      | 947 |
| a. | Charter and Bylaw Provisions  | 947 |
| b. | Poison Pill Plans   | 949 |
| c. | The Effect on Shareholder Wealth  | 950 |

|   |      |
|---|------|
| 3. The Adoption and Early Development of Proportionality Review | 951  |
| <i>Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.</i>                       | 951  |
| 4. The <i>Time-Warner</i> Case                                  | 959  |
| <i>Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Incorporated</i>      | 959  |
| <i>Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp.</i>                  | 967  |
| C. Friendly Transactions  | 980  |
| <i>Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &amp; Forbes Holdings, Inc.</i>   | 981  |
| 1. <i>Revlon's</i> Substantive Obligations                      | 986  |
| a. Information Requirement                                      | 986  |
| b. Structuring the Transaction                                  | 987  |
| 2. What Triggers <i>Revlon</i> ?                                | 991  |
| <i>Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc. (Del. Ch.)</i>   | 991  |
| <i>Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc. (Del.)</i>       | 994  |
| <i>Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.</i>      | 997  |
| 3. <i>Revlon</i> Review in Practice                             | 1002 |
| <i>In re Toys "R" Us, Inc., Shareholder Litigation</i>          | 1002 |
| 4. What Is the Standard of When <i>Revlon</i> Is Not Triggered? | 1010 |
| <i>Ace Limited v. Capital Re Corp.</i>                          | 1010 |
| <i>Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.</i>                   | 1014 |
| D. Sale of Control at a Premium                                 | 1030 |
| <i>Perlman v. Feldmann</i>                                      | 1031 |
| <i>Mendel v. Carroll</i>  | 1035 |
| <i>In re Digex Shareholders Litigation</i>                      | 1048 |
| E. Federal Regulation of Takeovers                              | 1055 |
| 1. Regulation of the Bidder                                     | 1055 |
| a. An Overview of the Williams Act                              | 1055 |
| b. What Is a Tender Offer?                                      | 1061 |
| c. Disclosure   | 1063 |
| 2. Regulation of the Target                                     | 1065 |
| a. Mandatory Disclosure: Schedule 14D-9                         | 1065 |
| b. Disclosure of Negotiations in Tender Offers                  | 1066 |
| c. Issuer Repurchases   | 1066 |
| F. Freeze-out Mergers   | 1067 |
| 1. Introduction: The History of the Conflict                    | 1068 |
| 2. The Current Framework: Entire Fairness                       | 1070 |
| <i>Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.</i>                                  | 1070 |
| 3. Fair Price   | 1079 |
| 4. Fair Dealing   | 1081 |

|    |  |      |
|----|--|------|
|    | <i>Kahn v. Lynch Communication<br/>Systems, Inc.</i>   | 1081 |
| 5. | Using a Tender Offer to Avoid Entire Fairness  | 1091 |
|    | <i>In re CNX Gas Corporation<br/>Shareholders Litigation</i>   | 1093 |
| G. | State Takeover Regulation  | 1106 |
|    | <i>Delaware General Corporation<br/>Law — Business Combinations with<br/>Interested Stockholders</i> | 1109 |
|    | <i>CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of<br/>America</i>  | 1111 |
| H. | Public Policy and Corporate Control<br>Transactions: The Stakeholder Debate                          | 1121 |
|    | <i>Table of Cases</i>  | 1127 |
|    | <i>Table of Statutes and Regulations</i>   | 1143 |
|    | <i>Index</i>   | 1157 |