

ASPEN CASEBOOK SERIES

***ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW***

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***NINTH EDITION***

***RICHARD A. POSNER***

*Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit  
Senior Lecturer, University of Chicago Law School*



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